Influenciados pelas discussões desenvolvidas por Álvaro Nascimento no artigo Trabalhadores Negros e o “Paradigma da Ausência”: contribuições à história social do trabalho no Brasil, pensamos este trabalho, cujo objetivo é analisar a instrumentalização da identidade negra nas estratégias argumentativas do Partido Comunista Brasileiro, das Ligas Camponesas e da Igreja Católica, forças que atuaram no campo brasileiro entre 1945 e 1964. Para tanto, consultamos um conjunto diversificado de periódicos e dialogamos com produções de diferentes centros de pesquisa.

Resumo: O presente texto tem como objetivo expor uma visão sobre como o conhecimento, o conteúdo e a utopia são concebidos dentro das filosofias de Platão (2000; 2016) e Theodor Adorno (2009). Trata-se de uma pesquisa bibliográfica, que busca articular as ideias dos autores mencionados por meio de um diálogo de considerações que passa, especialmente, pelas ideias platônicas de justiça e verdade, como também pelas ideias adornianas de contradição e não identidade. Este estudo compreende que tais conceitos são importantes para (...) se conhecer verdadeiramente as coisas e, com isso, acessar os seus conteúdos inerentes, como é a perspectiva de uma educação crítica. Palavras-chave: Conhecimento; Conteúdo; Utopia; Contradição; Verdade. Knowledge, Contents and Utopia Abstract: The aim of this text is to expose a view on how knowledge, content and utopia are planned within the philosophies of Plato (2000; 2016) and Theodor Adorno (2009). It is a bibliographical research, which seeks to articulate the ideas of the mentioned authors through a dialogue of considerations that passes, especially, through the platonic ideas of justice and truth, as well as the adornian ideas of contradiction and non-identity. This study understands that such concepts are important to truly know things and, with that, access their inherent contents, as is the perspective of a critical education. Keywords: Knowledge; Contents; Utopia; Contradiction; Truth. Saber, Contenidos y Utopía Resumen: El objetivo de este texto es exponer una mirada sobre cómo se planifican el conocimiento, el contenido y la utopía dentro de las filosofías de Platón (2000; 2016) y Theodor Adorno (2009). Se trata de una investigación bibliográfica que busca articular las ideas de los citados autores a través de un diálogo de consideraciones que transita, especialmente, por las ideas platónicas de justicia y verdad, así como las ideas adornianas de contradicción y no identidad. Este estudio entiende que tales conceptos son importantes para conocer verdaderamente las cosas y, con ello, acceder a sus contenidos inherentes, como es la perspectiva de una educación crítica. Palabras clave: Conocimiento; Contenido; Utopía; Contradicción; Verdad. Data de registro: 31/03/2022 Data de aceite: 13/12/2022. (shrink)

Counteracting a widespread interpretation of Schelling’s project of a philosophy of nature as anti-Kantian, this paper claims that Kant’s doctrine of the schematism plays a central role in the emergence and development of Schelling’s project. My argument will be structured in the following way. First, I will discuss Schelling’s reception of the schematism in his Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature of 1797, especially as regards his association of it with Kant’s dynamical conception of matter in the Metaphysical Foundations of (...) Natural Science. Relying on this reconstruction, I will argue, secondly, that Schelling brings together a central issue of the Critique of Pure Reason (the objectivity of pure concepts) and the overall problem of the Metaphysical Foundations (the transition from pure philosophy to empirical sciences) by addressing the issue of a schematism specifically related to outer sense. Thirdly, I maintain that this issue is at the core of the overall argument developed in the Ideas, where it appears in the form of a schematism of “materiality as such”. Finally, I suggest that the notion of a schematism of materiality as such offers a useful key to understanding the unfolding of Schelling’s project between 1797 and 1800. (shrink)

No prefácio da segunda edição da Crítica da razão pura, Kant propõe uma revolução metodológica em Filosofia similar à revolução copernicana: ao invés de tratar o observador como um centro fixo em torno do qual os objetos gravitam, pensá-lo antes como um móvel cujos movimentos cognitivos permitiriam explicar fenômenos anteriormente inexplicáveis. Alguns filósofos contemporâneos sugerem que essa revolução deva ser realizada de um ponto de vista geográfico, pois os problemas fundamentais da Filosofia parecem gravitar todos em torno do mesmo centro (...) fixo, o qual não é confrontado à fragilidade de sua posição geográfica contingente, o centro europeu. O objetivo deste artigo é reconstruir as linhas gerais dessa nova revolução copernicana como um procedimento de reavaliação de três vetores centrais do saber: o Eu, o Outro e o Todo. (shrink)

Das Ziel dieses Beitrages ist es, zu zeigen, wie das cartesianische Cogito ,der Boden der modernen Philosophie, das im Begriff des denkenden Subjekts – einem Schlüsselbegriff des westlichen Denkens – seinen Ursprung hat, von einer ganz bestimmten Methode, deren Legitimation in der Geschichte wurzelt, abhängig ist. Anders ausgedrückt, der Begriff des Subjekts, dessen grundlegendes Merkmal die Denktätigkeit ist, und der die Geschichte, eben weil er Begriff ist, hinnehmen muss, ist durch die Geschichte bedingt – durch eine Geschichte, die sich weniger (...) im Begriff selbst als in der ihn ermöglichenden Methode ausdrückt. Eine genaue genealogische Studie dieserMethode würde eine äußerst gründliche Arbeit erfordern; was wir hier viel-mehr unternehmen wollen ist lediglich, die von Descartes benutzten methodologischen Werkzeuge zu erforschen, die für die Formulierung des Begriffs Res Cogitans (die nach Kants Kritik zum „Subjekt“ wurde) vonnöten waren. Ein Werkzeug spielt laut der hier verteidigten Annahme eine besonders grundlegende Rolle in der benannten Diskussion um Res Cogitans : der Traum Descartes. (shrink)

Descartes faz alusão, no início da prova da existência do mundo externo material, à consciência de uma passividade que é dada pela involuntariedade das ideias dos sentidos. A experiência dessa passividade permite que a questão acerca de qual é a causa ativa que a explica seja colocada, o que conduz, ao final dos passos do raciocínio, ao conhecimento da existência dos corpos como as causas das ideias dos sentidos. O objetivo desse artigo é examinar o papel que as ideias dos (...) sentidos desempenham na referida prova para responder se o que conta como premissa para a prova é apenas a passividade das ideias dos sentidos, ou se o conteúdo representativo dessas ideias também está envolvido na prova. A questão que atravessa o objetivo de investigar o papel das ideias dos sentidos na prova da existência do mundo externo diz respeito àquilo que essas ideias, enquanto ponto de partida para a prova, permitem concluir acerca dos corpos, a saber, 1) que eles existem – simplesmente; ou 2) não apenas que eles existem, mas também algo de mais específico sobre sua natureza – de modo que, nesse caso, as ideias dos sentidos possuiriam (de alguma forma) validade objetiva. Nossa hipótese consiste em que as ideias dos sentidos, na prova da existência do mundo material, não se reduzem a meros índices da existência dos corpos à medida que seu conteúdo representativo desempenha um papel importante na conclusão da prova, que é o de inclinar o sujeito a crer que a causa das ideias dos sentidos são os corpos. E, dessa forma, as ideias dos sentidos possuiriam algum grau de validade objetiva e a partir delas poderíamos extrair algum conhecimento específico sobre os corpos. (shrink)

This paper attempts to answer, as well as give metaphysical specificity to, a question within the philosophy and theology of gender which strikes the heart of the Christian confession of the gospel. Against critics who say that the masculinity of Christ’s human nature renders him unable to save women as well as men, it draws on the recent literature on feminist metaphysics and analytic Christology to develop a model of the Incarnation able to avoid such criticisms.

This paper advances the idea that Oswald de Andrade's Anthropophagy, formulated for the first time in 1928, can be read as a decolonial project avant la lettre. In order to establish this thesis, we will reconstruct the project of the Brazilian thinker through a detailed analysis of the first aphorism of his Manifesto Antropófago (Anthropophagist Manifesto). We will argue that, similarly to what will be later articulated by the decolonial approach, Andrade indicates: (i) that the cultural and economic dimensions of (...) colonialism are entangled ramifications of a larger structure of domination; (ii) that capitalism is an aspect of this larger structure; and (iii) that it is necessary to articulate a third political path irreducible to both capitalism and communism. Anthropophagy would thus function not only as the evident metaphor of cultural appropriation, but also as a diagnosis of the colonial domination and as a therapeutic to face it within a decolonial project. (shrink)

The Protestant ethic — a moral code stressing hard work, rigorous self-discipline, and the organization of one's life in the service of God — was made famous by sociologist and political economist Max Weber. In this brilliant study (his best-known and most controversial), he opposes the Marxist concept of dialectical materialism and its view that change takes place through "the struggle of opposites." Instead, he relates the rise of a capitalist economy to the Puritan determination to work out anxiety over (...) salvation or damnation by performing good deeds — an effort that ultimately discouraged belief in predestination and encouraged capitalism. Weber's classic study has long been required reading in college and advanced high school social studies classrooms. (shrink)

This paper claims that the inner drive of the discussion leading to the philosophical rupture between Fichte and Schelling is the problem of the independence of nature. I argue that the otherwise rich literature on the subject, by not engaging with this problem, has led to a false dichotomy between two equally unsatisfactory possibilities of interpretation: Schelling’s misunderstanding of Kant’s transcendental method or his overcoming of it. On my account, once one engages with Schelling’s philosophy of nature, it becomes clear (...) that he, just as Fichte, is exploring the inner tensions of Kant’s philosophy, even though he does it in a different and original direction. (shrink)

Cet article montre que Fichte développe une originelle conception du langage dans ses Discours à la Nation allemande d’où il ressort non seulement le besoin de retraduire des concepts philosophiques dans un langage populaire comme aussi celui de formuler un langage plus malléable pour la philosophie en tant que telle. Afin d’explorer cette hypothèse, notre propos suivra les étapes suivantes : (i) nous analyserons la conception fichtéenne du rapport entre popularisation et flexibilisation du langage, ce qui nous permettra (ii) d’explorer (...) les raisons systématiques du rapprochement entre langue philosophique et langue populaire et (iii) de saisir précisément la compréhension du rôle philosophique du langage qui en découle. (shrink)

This paper proposes to reconstruct Boaventura de Sousa Santos' conception of "epistemologies of the south" both (a) as a critical theory aiming at denouncing the impoverishment of the epistemic field entailed by the normative imposition of a certain model of knowledge (what we call "the monoculture of reason"), and (b) as a long-term political project of a harmonic coexistence of different epistemologies ("an ecology of knowledges").

Independently of the discussions on the development of Fichte’s philosophy, there is something that does not seem to change throughout the more than a dozen presentations of his doctrine, namely, his constant concern with the meaning of philosophy. This concern is such a structuring one for Fichte that he even decides to replace the very name of “philosophy” by another one, less heavy in meaning and better suited to elucidate the nature of this particular activity that constitutes his own project. (...) He calls it the Wissenschaftslehre. In this term created by Fichte three verbs can be found: wissen (to know), schaffen (to create) and lehren (to teach) – we would like to propose that Fichte’s conception of philosophy can be brought out as the orchestrated action of those three activities: knowing, creating and teaching. The point here being not to say that Fichte had the idea in mind of composing these three verbs (wissen, schaffen, lehren) when he created the term Wissenschaftslehre, but only that those terms offer useful landmarks for the exploration of Fichte’s philosophical landscape. -/- . (shrink)

The aim of this article is to advance the idea according to which the Cartesian Cogito, the ground of modern philosophy and the source of the notion of thinking subject, is tributary of a certain method whose legitimation is grounded in western history. According to this hypothesis, there is a certain tool that plays a fundamental role in the production of this new philosophical notion: the dream. The argument will be developed in four parts. We will first proceed to (i) (...) an analysis of the role of the hypothesis of the dream in the formulation of the notion of res cogitans, what will bring us to (ii) an exploration of the conception of private world supposed by such a hypothesis so as to (iii) clarify the specificity of the Cartesian notion of knowledge, a knowledge that must be acquirable in a dream; in conclusion (iv) we will indicate in a schematic way the historic-cultural anchor of the Cartesian dream where the subject is originated. (shrink)

This article advances the hypothesis that the Fichtean enterprise of grounding all possible experience in a fundamental principle has to fail in order to succeed one of its most important tasks: reformulating the very idea of subjectivity. In order to ground this hypothesis, the paper will be divided in four parts: (i) the first one will analyze the starting point of the work where Fichte lays the foundations of his philosophical project (Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre) so as to show that (...) its first principle contains a fundamental ambiguity. We will then (ii) suggest that this very ambiguity reveals itself in the Anstoß, the conceptual tool through which Fichte intends to get rid of the Kantian notion of thing-in- itself. In a third moment (iii), we will explore the effects of this abandonment of the thing-in-itself on the relation between the finite and the infinite, what will bring us to the notion of failure. Finally (iv), we will propose to interpret this failure as a positive driving force of a permanent calling into question of the subject and its language. (shrink)

This paper explores the contrast between two meanings of thinking: (i) one implied by the Cartesian and Kantian philosophy, the two thinkers that have arguably the deepest influence on the constellation of Western philosophical problems and (ii) another implied by the philosophical-anthropological project of the Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. The thesis here defended is that, in the Cartesian and Kantian philosophy, thinking is related to ruling and legislating over the experience through concepts, while in Viveiros de Castros' theoretical (...) enterprise, thinking is rather to explore the limits of conceptual constructions when confronted with the experience of alterity. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine the peculiarity of what Aristotle named practical wisdom or practical knowledge. Pivot to our analysis is the first thesis of the Nicomachean Ethics, where the philosopher appears to state a fallacy when he argues that, given that all actions aim at some good, good is that which every action aims to. We argue that the inference is non-fallacious because of the peculiarity of the practical domain, which manifests itself in the identity of (...) the good and the end. This identity is in the origin of what we would call, as an hypothesis, practical significance. (shrink)

Writing from a scientifically and philosophically informed perspective, the authors provide a critical overview of the conceptual difficulties encountered in many current neuroscientific and psychological theories.

Este artigo argumenta que Fichte, nas primeiras formulações de seu projeto filosófico, apreende a tarefa da filosofia não tanto como uma Crítica da Razão, mas antes como um Autoconhecimento do Espírito, trazendo assim a noção de Espírito para o centro da discussão filosófica. Exploramos o que Fichte entende por Espírito e argumentamos que essa noção, ainda que ela não seja usada de modo consistente ao longo de sua obra, cobre um espaço conceitual fundamental do projeto filosófico fichtiano. O argumento será (...) estruturado como uma exploração de cada uma das dimensões desse espaço, a saber: o Espírito como auto-‑relação; o Espírito como imaginação produtiva; e o Espírito como o resultado do processo de aprendizado fundado nos impulsos humanos. (shrink)

Ce travail avance l’idée que le projet philosophique fichtéen consiste en une exploration de la notion même de philosophie dont les contours peuvent être esquissés à partir du remplacement du nom "Philosophia" par le nom Wissenschaftslehre. Cette substitution est le fruit d’une réflexion sur les conditions de possibilité non seulement de la connaissance scientifique, mais aussi du savoir philosophique en tant que tel, lequel doit être compris non comme un rapport sujet-objet, mais comme une activité autoréflexive visant à articuler une (...) vision systématique du tout. Une telle conception pose un défi au langage philosophique, en ceci qu’il ne saurait être conçu comme un langage représentatif et qu’il devient par là, selon Fichte, irréductible à un texte écrit ; face à ce défi, il est nécessaire de constamment réactiver le philosopher derrière les concepts, ce que Fichte fait, selon nous, en présentant sa philosophie dans différentes langues conceptuelles. Le constant éveil de cette activité dépend pourtant d’un travail pédagogique visant à : (i) rapprocher la langue savante de la langue quotidienne, (ii) engendrer une conscience historique et (iii) établir un espace d’apprentissage collectif. (shrink)

This article puts forward the thesis that Schelling's philosophical engagement with chemistry plays a key role in his project of a philosophy of nature. I claim that Schelling takes Lavoisier's new chemistry to indicate that Kant's dynamical theory of matter could provide the basis for a unified account of nature. By dynamical theory of matter, I understand a philosophical explanation of matter based on the fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion. I argue that Schelling combines Kant's dynamics with Lavoisier's new (...) chemistry into what he calls dynamical chemistry, and that this notion of dynamical chemistry underlies his attempt at a unified system of nature. (shrink)

Introductory Remarks IN A MAJOR WORK planned for the near future I will attempt to develop a non-formal ethics of Values on the broadest possible basis of ...

The book "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" is an engaging criticism of cognitive neuroscience from the perspective of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of ordinary language. The authors' main claim is that assertions like "the brain sees" and "the left hemisphere thinks" are integral to cognitive neuroscience but that they are meaningless because they commit the mereological fallacy—ascribing to parts of humans, properties that make sense to predicate only of whole humans. The authors claim that this fallacy is at the heart of Cartesian (...) dualism, implying that current cognitive neuroscientists are Cartesian dualists. Against this claim, we argue that the fallacy cannot be committed within Cartesian dualism either, for this doctrine does not allow for an intelligible way of asserting that a soul is part of a human being. Also, the authors' Aristotelian essentialistic outlook is at odds with their Wittgensteinian stance, and we were unconvinced by their case against explanatory reductionism. Finally, although their Wittgensteinian stance is congenial with radical behaviorism, their separation between philosophy and science seems less so because it is based on a view of philosophy as a priori. The authors' emphasis on the a priori, however, does not necessarily commit them to rationalism if it is restricted to conceptual or analytical truths. (shrink)

Nachdruck des Originals von 1916. Max Scheler wurde v.a. durch sein Werk Formalismus in der der Ethik und die materielle Wertethik bekannt, was erstmals 1913 erschien und hier in einer Ausgabe von 1916 vorliegt. Die von ihm vorgestellte Wertethik ist durch ein Loslösen von der kantschen Pfichtethik gekennzeichnet.

Delusional beliefs have sometimes been considered as rational inferences from abnormal experiences. We explore this idea in more detail, making the following points. Firstly, the abnormalities of cognition which initially prompt the entertaining of a delusional belief are not always conscious and since we prefer to restrict the term “experience” to consciousness we refer to “abnormal data” rather than “abnormal experience”. Secondly, we argue that in relation to many delusions (we consider eight) one can clearly identify what the abnormal cognitive (...) data are which prompted the delusion and what the neuropsychological impairment is which is responsible for the occurrence of these data; but one can equally clearly point to cases where this impairments is present but delusion is not. So the impairment is not sufficient for delusion to occur. A second cognitive impairment, one which impairs the ability to evaluate beliefs, must also be present. Thirdly (and this is the main thrust of our chapter) we consider in detail what the nature of the inference is that leads from the abnormal data to the belief. This is not deductive inference and it is not inference by enumerative induction; it is abductive inference. We offer a Bayesian account of abductive inference and apply it to the explanation of delusional belief. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo é um exercício de leitura comparada dos textos Reden an die deutsche Nation, publicado por Johann Gottlieb Fichte, em Berlim, em 1808, e Crítica da razão tupiniquim, publicado por Roberto Gomes, em São Paulo, em 1977. Se, à primeira vista, os dois universos de discurso parecem tão distantes que dificilmente se vê o que os aproxima, parece haver contudo uma flama comum que os anima, na medida em que ambos buscam evitar o aprisionamento do espírito local nos (...) grilhões de um universo simbólico que não é o seu. O objetivo deste estudo é explorar cada uma das obras, em seus respectivos contextos, a fim de delinear os aspectos dessa chama comum que as motiva; após a confrontação dos dois textos, far-se-á, como conclusão, um breve esboço dos possíveis ganhos dessa abordagem comparativa.: This article is an exercise in the comparative reading of the Fichte’s Reden an die deutsche Nation, published in Berlin in 1808, and Robert Gomes’ Crítica da razão tupiniquim, published in São Paulo in 1977. At first glance, the two universes of discourse appear to be so distant as to render considerably difficult any kind of comparison. However, they seem to be animated by a common spirit inasmuch as both are essays that articulate an epistemological resistance to the imminent danger of being enclosed in a symbolic universe that bears no contact with their own socio-political realities. The aim of this study is to explore each text in its respective context, so as to delineate the main aspects of their commonality. After the comparing the texts, we say a brief word in conclusion on the relevance of this comparative approach. (shrink)

Este estudo é uma exploração da concepção de lógica como uma “história pragmática da alma [pragmatische Seelengeschichte]”, tal como ela é formulada pelo médico e filósofo alemão Ernst Platner. Da análise dessa fórmula, pretende-se extrair um esboço do modo como ele concebe as noções de: alma, história, lógica e filosofia. Para tanto, o argumento será estruturado como uma análise: da alma enquanto objeto de estudo da lógica; da história pragmática enquanto método de estudo da lógica; e da compreensão da relação (...) entre lógica e filosofia extraída por Platner dessa abordagem. O objetivo deste trabalho não é fazer uma avaliação crítica da teoria de Platner, mas antes fazer um esboço do horizonte de questões que se abre a partir dessa compreensão da porta de entrada da filosofia – a lógica – como uma espécie de história da alma. (shrink)

Résumé L’article vise à souligner la signification politique de l’avènement de la Critique kantienne. Pour ce faire, une double thèse est défendue : il y a une matrice juridique sous-jacente au mouvement conceptuel de la philosophie critique, dont la puissance émancipatrice et révolutionnaire se manifeste à la lumière du contexte historique de sa formulation. L’argument se déploie de la façon suivante : une exploration des rapports entre la formule « révolution de la pensée » que l’on trouve dans la Critique (...) de la raison pure et le contexte historique de la publication l’œuvre ; ensuite un examen de la métaphore juridique et la façon dont elle incarne l’idée d’une philosophie critique ; et pour conclure la suggestion d’une hypothèse interprétative d’après laquelle le « contrat originaire » est un opérateur conceptuel accomplissant un mouvement analogue à celui qui est exigé de la philosophie critique : le passage du niveau individuel au niveau intersubjectif.The aim of the article is to highlight the political significance of the advent of Kant’s Critique. In order to establish it, a double thesis is defended: there is a juridical matrix underlying the conceptual movement of the critical philosophy, whose emancipatory and revolutionary strength is revealed in the light of the context of its formulation. The argument will be deployed in the following way: an exploration of the connections between the formula “a revolution in thought” articulated in the Critique and the historical context of its publication; followed by an exam of the juridical metaphor of the Tribunal and the way in which it embodies the idea of a critical philosophy and finally, as a conclusion, the suggestion of an interpretative hypothesis according to which the notion of contract is a conceptual operator accomplishing an analogous movement to the one required from the critical philosophy: the passage from the subjective level to the intersubjective one. (shrink)

The following text looks at certain philosophical points of convergence and divergence between Novalis and Fichte with respect to their theories of nature. Somewhat notoriously, Fichte places nature in opposition to the I (Ich) of the human being, designating the natural world using the abstract formula “Not-I”. Yet Fichte also insists that this abstraction should be made concrete and particular, as both an “it” and as a “you”. This chapter argues that Novalis did not reject Fichte’s theory of nature as (...) a Not-I — as is often claimed in the research. Rather, the inverse is actually the case: Novalis positively adopted and expanded on the Fichtean conception of nature as a “you”. (shrink)

Classical German Philosophy has traditionally been understood as the period in the history of ideas in which the investigation of the human mind takes precedence over the investigation of the natural world. This assessment has a twofold consequence. On the one hand, the philosophy of the period has been praised for its contributions to our understanding of multiple expressions of human rationality such as history, art, and religion. On the other hand, such a philosophy has been criticized for its obscure (...) speculations alien to the standards of modern scientific cognition. The philosophy of nature developed at the time has been accordingly dismissed as a piece of outdated metaphysics. Challenging this view, the contributions collected in this book argue for the historical and contemporary relevance of the approaches to nature formulated at the time. (shrink)

Durch eine Untersuchung der Stoßvorgänge wird die Auffassung entwickelt, daß die Quantenmechanik in der Schrödingerschen Form nicht nur die stationären Zustände, sondern auch die Quantensprünge zu beschreiben gestattet.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps, and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may (...) freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

To write of “the” philosophy of transhumanism is a little daring. The growth of transhumanism as a movement and philosophy means that differing perspectives on it have formed.

Max Scheler: Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos Edition Holzinger. Taschenbuch Berliner Ausgabe, 2016 Vollständiger, durchgesehener Neusatz bearbeitet und eingerichtet von Michael Holzinger Erstdruck: 1928. Herausgeber der Reihe: Michael Holzinger Reihengestaltung: Viktor Harvion Gesetzt aus der Minion Pro, 11 pt.